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“I want the world. I want the whole world. I want  
to lock it all up in my pocket. . . . Give it to me NOW!”1
 Admit it: you and your mobile phone2 are virtually inseparable. 
You regularly send and receive e-mail from the device. You and your 
mobile phone are in constant contact.3 As Americans become 
?  J.D., cum laude, Florida State University College of Law, 2012; B.A., English, 
Florida State University, 2002. I am grateful to Professor Wayne Logan for sparking and 
encouraging my fascination with criminal procedure. 
 1.  These are the famous words of fictional spoiled brat, Veruca Salt, as delivered 
musically in Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory. Ms. Salt, of course, was not speaking of 
her desire for constant access to the Internet, but rather her desire for a golden goose. 
WILLY WONKA & THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY.
 2. Throughout this Note, I will use the term “mobile phone” to refer to a wireless 
telephone one typically carries in her pocket or purse. This term is interchangeable with 
the term “cell phone” or “cellular phone.” 
 3. The chance that I am accurately describing you is quite high. “Eight in ten American 
adults . . . own a [mobile] phone of some kind.” AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT, AMERICANS AND THEIR CELL PHONES 5 (Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter SMITH, CELL
PHONES], http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/cell%20Phones%202011.pdf. 
In April 2009, the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that 25% of mobile phone 
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increasingly tethered to their mobile phones, privacy considerations 
become apparent. In our fervor to have the fastest, the best, the most 
connected mobile phone, we have lost sight of some of the negative 
consequences of being hyper-connected. As users demand and 
manufacturers provide quicker access to e-mail, the Internet, and 
data, mobile phones become a repository for vast quantities of 
information. This information is highly concentrated and easily 
accessible from the mobile device. As this occurs, Fourth Amendment 
concerns are necessarily implicated because more and more material 
becomes vulnerable to discovery by law enforcement officers during a 
search. The United States Supreme Court has developed a Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that, carried to its logical conclusion, 
threatens to open up an immeasurable amount of private and 
personal information to agents of the government.4
 In the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the reasonableness of a 
search, mobile phones—and “smartphones” with Internet capabilities 
in particular5—should be afforded the same level of protection that 
laptop computers are afforded. At present, case law is sparse 
regarding searches of computers when those computers are 
discovered inside a vehicle or otherwise outside the home;6 however, 
mobile phones arguably should be treated as if they were computers, 
as the distinction has become blurred and is likely to become more 
blurred in the future.7 Given that many mobile phones now provide 
instant access to the user’s e-mail and other Internet 
                                                                                                                  
users accessed the Internet wirelessly via mobile phone; that number jumped to 38% by 
May 2010 and 44% by May 2011. See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
MOBILE ACCESS 2010 at 12 (July 7, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/ 
Reports/2010/PIP_Mobile_Access_2010.pdf; see also SMITH CELL PHONES, supra, at 5-6.  
 4.  For a somewhat recent analysis of these issues from a law enforcement 
perspective, see Carl Milazzo, Chief’s Counsel, Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: 
2009 Update, POLICE CHIEF, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/ 
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&issue_id=52009&category_ID=3. 
 5.  Mobile phones possessing these capabilities are often referred to as “smartphones.” See
Jo Best, Analysis: What is a Smart Phone?, ZDNET.CO.UK (Feb. 13, 2006, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/mobile-it/2006/02/03/analysis-what-is-a-smart-phone-40148352/. 
PC Magazine Encyclopedia defines a smartphone as “[a] cellular telephone with built-in 
applications and Internet access.” Definition of: Smartphone, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp (last 
visited July 1, 2012). One recent study has shown that 82% of smartphone users check and 
receive e-mail through their devices. GOOGLE/IPSOS OTX MEDIACT, THE 
MOBILE MOVEMENT: UNDERSTANDING SMARTPHONE USERS 11 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.gstatic.com/ads/research/en/2011_TheMobileMovement.pdf. For additional 
information regarding the smartphone habits of Americans, see AARON SMITH, SMARTPHONE 
ADOPTION AND USAGE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (July 11, 2011), 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Smartphones/Summary.aspx.  
 6. There is, however, an increasingly large body of case law dealing with searches of 
mobile phones under these circumstances.  See infra Part III.A. 
 7.  United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573,  
at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he line between cell phones and personal computers has grown 
increasingly blurry . . . .”). 
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communications,8 any doctrine that treats a mobile phone like an 
ordinary closed container9 in Fourth Amendment analysis fails to 
address meaningful differences in the type and quantity of personal 
information that is now accessible through a mobile phone and fails 
to adequately consider privacy concerns of mobile phone users.  
 The reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”10 While “houses, papers, and 
effects” might have been, at ratification, a satisfactory battery of 
items expressly afforded Fourth Amendment protections, ever 
advancing technologies have complicated and continue to complicate 
the judiciary’s application of those words to real-life situations. 
 Since the early years of the United States’ sovereignty, Americans 
have strongly supported the notion that a person enjoys a special sort 
of privacy in his own dwelling, as evidenced by the writings of John 
Adams.11 Both in English common law and in nineteenth-century 
America, victims of eavesdropping had an actionable nuisance claim 
against the person who listened in on them surreptitiously.12 As time 
and technology have progressed, these protections have expanded 
and have shaped the country’s definition of what type of intercepted 
communication constitutes a “search” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. One constant in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
been its willingness to distinguish addressing information, which is 
used to convey a communication, from the actual content of a 
communication. Under this formulation, the collection of addressing 
information such as telephone numbers does not constitute a search 
and therefore does not enjoy the Fourth Amendment protection that 
the content of a telephone call does.13 Even in the late nineteenth 
century, the Supreme Court recognized the Fourth Amendment 
concerns in the contents of a private communication when the Court 
held that mail could not be intercepted, opened, and read by agents of 
 8.  See SMITH, supra note 5.  
 9. The United States Supreme Court has defined a container as “any object capable 
of holding another object,” and has stated that this classification “includes closed or open 
glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger 
compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 11.  1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 
1965) (describing a man’s dwelling house as his “[c]astle”). 
 12.  See Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the 
United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83,  
95 (2008). 
 13. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979). 
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the government absent a warrant.14 The Court has subsequently 
upheld the sanctity granted to content information as opposed to 
addressing information,15 and this distinction ensures that the court 
views differently materials that a person affirmatively exposes to the 
public and materials that a person elects to keep private.16 Thus, 
when the government gathers information that the sender has 
necessarily exposed to others, no “search” has been performed17 and 
Fourth Amendment protections do not apply;18 however, when the 
government gathers information that a citizen sought to retain as 
private, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and such information 
is protected from public exposure.19
 In this Note, I examine the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as it relates to the warrant exceptions approved in 
searches incident to arrest and searches of automobiles I then 
analyze the implications these doctrines have for the 
constitutionality of searches of mobile phones. In Part I, I lay a 
foundation for further discussion by tracing the history of Fourth 
Amendment searches of containers in the context of searches incident 
to arrest made outside the home and searches conducted pursuant to 
the judicially crafted “automobile exception.” In Part II, I explore how 
the court has handled (and mishandled) other emerging technologies. 
In Part III, I examine how courts, academics, and legislatures have 
addressed government searches of mobile phones, and I discuss and 
critique several scholars’ proposals for how the Supreme Court 
should ultimately handle the issue of increased law enforcement 
access to private communications via smartphones. Finally, in Part 
IV, I conclude that in a search a mobile phone should be treated 
exactly as a laptop is treated and I offer closing remarks  
with regard to how courts should handle these difficult questions. 
 14.  Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (citing Ex Parte Jackson affirming the government’s need for a 
warrant prior to opening a wrapped package). 
 15.  United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Smith, 442 U.S. 735, and extending the Court’s 
line of reasoning in those cases to e-mail communications). See also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.2(a) (3d ed. 2007) (noting that mail, such as a postcard, 
which does not conceal its contents from the public does not enjoy Fourth Amendment 
protection). For an enlightening and thorough discussion of the outside/inside and 
content/non-content dichotomies as they relate to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in an 
Internet age, see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010). 
 16.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52; Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511. 
 17.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. 
 18.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 19.  Id. at 351-52. 
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I. FOUNDATIONS
 In the beginning, there was the Fourth Amendment.20 Of course, 
its proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures was developed 
in a context quite different from the one in which today’s courts must 
decide cases. To ponder how the Framers may have felt about a 
computer or mobile phone search would be an exercise in absurdity. 
At the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted, the prevailing 
concern was to provide protection from the issuance of general 
warrants, upon which the government was entitled to search 
everything and everywhere without consideration of the purpose or 
scope of the search.21 The Fourth Amendment, as is evidenced from 
its text, requires that a search be reasonable and that a search be 
conducted only after the issuance of a warrant. Over time, the Court 
has established various exceptions to the warrant requirement.22
Generally, however, the reasonableness clause must be satisfied, 
even where a valid warrant exception applies.23 For the purposes of 
 20.  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. 
 21.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“The Amendment was in large part 
a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the 
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.”). 
 22.  Although the Court has described these exceptions as few and as “jealously and 
carefully drawn,” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958), their proliferation over 
the years has exploded. Some examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement that the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized are as follows: Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398 (2006) (exigent circumstances); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 87) (special 
needs); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218  (1973) (consent); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443  (1971) (automobile exception); Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 (warrantless 
search incident to arrest). See also Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (citing more than twenty exceptions to either the 
probable cause requirement or the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).  
 23.  STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 32 (9th ed. 2010) (“When an exception to the warrant 
requirement is applicable, only the reasonableness requirement must be satisfied.”). I am 
of the mind that where the warrant requirement has been dispensed with by one of the 
Court’s judicially crafted warrant exceptions, reasonableness must not be automatically 
assumed but must be evaluated by the Court. Nevertheless, at least one court facing a 
mobile phone search issue described the search as falling under an exception to the 
reasonableness clause, rather than the warrant clause. See United States v. Wurie, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing a 
warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal containers 
found on a defendant’s person that fall within the Edwards-Lafayette exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements.”). This statement seems, on its face, to 
be flatly incorrect; in both Edwards and Lafayette, the Court applied the inventory 
exception to the warrant requirement and then went on to explain why each of these 
searches was indeed reasonable as required by the Fourth Amendment. See United States 
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 806 (1974) (applying inventory exception and pointing 
out that law enforcement officers’ actions in seizing evidence was reasonable); Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (applying inventory exception and holding that “it is 
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this Note, I will briefly describe two of the warrant exceptions: (1) the 
automobile exception and (2) the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 
A.   The Automobile Exception 
 The automobile exception has its roots in Carroll v. United 
States,24 in which the Supreme Court validated a warrantless search 
of a vehicle that uncovered “intoxicating liquor” that was being 
transported illegally.25 Distilled to its essence, the automobile 
exception allows law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless 
search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.26 As the Court has 
sought to develop and flesh out this exception, it has relied primarily 
on two justifications: (1) the inherent mobility of automobiles and (2) 
a decreased expectation of privacy in the contents of an automobile.27
 In United States v. Ross, the Court held that when officers are 
conducting a warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to the 
automobile exception, such officers may look inside closed containers 
they discover within the vehicle.28 However, as is often the case, the 
Court’s clear-cut rule was not quite clear enough. In 1982, at the time 
Ross was decided, the Court still had some perplexing precedent to 
wrestle with. In the late 1970s, the Court held in United States v. 
Chadwick29 and Arkansas v. Sanders30 that a warrant was required 
for law enforcement officers to conduct a search of certain containers 
located inside a vehicle. In Chadwick, the Court stated the question 
as “whether a search warrant is required before federal agents may 
open a locked footlocker which they have lawfully seized at the time 
                                                                                                                  
not ‘unreasonable’ for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an 
arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with 
established inventory procedures.”). 
 24.  267 U.S. 132 (1925). It is not entirely certain the Justices handing down that 
decision knew they were creating a vast blanket exception to the warrant requirement. 
Nothing in the Carroll opinion describes the search that took place as an “exception.” See
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132-162. In fact, the United States Supreme Court did not use the 
term “automobile exception” until almost fifty years after the Carroll decision. See 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 462. 
 25.  Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. 
 26.  Id. at 149 (“On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure 
without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising 
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle 
contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure  
are valid.”). 
 27.  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 829-31 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the historical rationales for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement). 
 28.  Id. at 821 (“When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its 
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between . . . glove compartments, 
upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages . . . must give way to the interest in the 
prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.”). 
 29.  433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 30.  442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
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of the arrest of its owners, when there is probable cause to believe the 
footlocker contains contraband.”31 The Court held that a warrant was 
required under these circumstances.32 Two years later, the Court 
seemingly reinforced its Chadwick reasoning holding that, absent 
exigent circumstances, a warrant was required for law enforcement 
officers to conduct a search of a piece of luggage seized from inside an 
automobile.33 The Ross Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders,
pointing out that officers had probable cause to search the luggage at 
issue in those cases, but did not have probable cause to search the 
vehicle generally, as was the case in Ross.34
 In California v. Acevedo, the Court clarified its interpretation and 
application of the automobile exception in an apparent attempt to 
settle any remaining confusion.35 The Court returned to the case in 
which the automobile exception was first conceived and interpreted 
“Carroll as providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The 
police may search an automobile and the containers within it where 
they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is 
contained.”36 After Acevedo, it seems clear that where probable cause 
exists to believe contraband or evidence is contained within a vehicle, 
law enforcement officers are empowered to look inside any containers 
inside the vehicle. 
B.   Search Incident to Arrest 
 The Court also recognizes an exception to the warrant 
requirement in which officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless 
search of an “arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate 
control’ ” at the time of arrest.37 Warrantless searches incident to 
arrest have been justified by the Court on the basis of officer safety.38
In Belton, the Court made clear that Chimel’s permissible search of 
the arrestee’s person and the “grab area” around him extended to 
searches incident to arrest in the automobile context.39 In the most 
 31.  Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3.  
 32.  Id. at 15-16. 
 33.  Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766 (“Where . . . the police, without endangering themselves 
or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity 
and secured his suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judicial approval 
has been obtained.”). 
 34.  See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982). 
 35.  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). The Court noted that the 
Chadwick-Sanders rule and the holding in Ross had caused tremendous confusion among 
legal scholars, courts, and law enforcement officers. See id. at 576-77. 
 36.  Id. at 580. 
 37.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 38.  Id. (noting the arrestee’s ability to reach out and grab “a weapon or  
destructible evidence”). 
 39.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“[W]e hold that when a policeman 
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
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recent Supreme Court case to speak on this issue, Arizona v. Gant,
the Court held that a warrantless search incident to arrest of an 
automobile occupant is permissible only where the search is confined 
to a search for evidence related to the arresting offense or in cases 
where the arrestee is not secured and could conceivably reach the 
interior of the vehicle.40
 The Court created an additional wrinkle to the search incident to 
arrest analysis in 1973 when it announced a search inside a 
crumpled cigarette package on the person of an arrestee is “not only 
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
but also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”41 Officers 
arrested Willie Robinson, Jr., for driving with a revoked license,42 and 
in the course of their search of Robinson’s person they discovered 
heroin concealed inside a cigarette package inside his coat pocket.43
The Robinson court acknowledged the “unqualified authority of the 
arresting authority to search the person of the arrestee,”44 and noted 
that the validity of a search of the area within an arrestee’s control 
“has been subject to differing interpretations as to the extent of the 
area which may be searched.”45
 Several state and federal courts have relied on this distinction in 
Robinson to validate as “searches of the person” searches of mobile 
phones in the pockets of citizens at the time of their arrests.46 Other 
courts refuse to classify a mobile phone in an arrestee’s pocket as 
subject to a search-of-the-person analysis, instead ruling that a 
mobile phone found on the arrestee’s person may not automatically 
be searched as part of a person-search incident to arrest.47 The 
traditional basis for the warrantless search incident to arrest has 
been that it is reasonable for officers to search for “weapons, 
instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a person is taken 
                                                                                                                  
automobile. It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of 
any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment 
is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.”) (internal  
citations omitted). 
 40.  556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (“[W]e hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle 
search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot 
access the interior of the vehicle. . . . [W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the 
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”).  
 41.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 42.  See id. at 220. 
 43.  Id. at 223.  
 44.  Id. at 225. 
 45.  Id. at 224. 
 46.  See infra Part III.A. 
 47.  See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. 
May 23, 2007). 
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into official custody and lawfully detained.”48 This rationale is echoed 
in Gant’s holding that searches incident to arrest must be limited 
where the suspect has been secured and where there is no reason to 
believe evidence of crime is contained inside the arrestee’s vehicle.49
Depending on the facts of an arrest and how the Court chooses to 
interpret the intersection of these related doctrines, a warrantless 
search of a mobile phone incident to arrest may or may not be 
deemed reasonable by the Court. For example, in Edwards, a search 
of the arrestee’s clothing certainly seemed reasonable, given that the 
clothes were likely to contain evidence of his crime.50 However, 
because officers are empowered to arrest citizens even for extremely 
minor crimes,51 it is plausible officers might arrest simply because it 
gives license to a person-search.  
C.   Closed Containers 
 Intermingled in the Court’s precedent surrounding warrantless 
searches of vehicles is the question of whether or not officers may 
conduct a warrantless search of a container discovered within a 
vehicle, on the person of an arrestee, or within the arrestee’s 
immediate control. Generally, where an officer meets the 
requirements of either the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine52 or 
conducts a search pursuant to the automobile exception, the court 
has permitted a search of all containers inside the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle.53 The Court has refused to draw a line 
between types of containers that are more protected than others.54 If 
a container is within the arrestee’s reach or if officers have probable 
 48.  United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 
at 235). See also id. at 806 (“When it became apparent that the articles of clothing were 
evidence of the crime for which Edwards was being held, the police were entitled to  
take, examine, and preserve them for use as evidence, just as they are normally permitted 
to seize evidence of crime when it is lawfully encountered.”). 
 49.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
 50. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 806. 
 51.  See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324, 354 (2001) (approving of 
arrest for failure to wear a seatbelt). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an 
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Id. at 354. 
 52.  This search authority is limited by Gant to situations in which the arrestee is 
unsecured or when it is reasonable to believe evidence related to the arresting offense may 
be found inside the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
 53. See id.; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). 
 54.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 (noting that the Court refuses to classify some containers as 
“worthy” and others as “unworthy”). “[A] traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few 
articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim[s] an equal right to conceal his 
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché  
case.” Id.
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cause to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest, officers 
may search without first obtaining a warrant.55
 But what exactly is a “container”? The Supreme Court, in Belton,
stated that the term “container . . . denotes any object capable of 
holding another object.”56 Thus, the Court stated, it “includes closed 
or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located 
anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, 
boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”57
 Is a mobile phone a closed container? Is a laptop a closed 
container? Does it matter?58 The closed container analysis is 
necessarily based on containers that are physical objects capable of 
holding other physical objects. One need only closely examine the 
Court’s language in Belton to confirm this.59 Given that several state 
courts and Courts of Appeals have extended the closed container 
analysis to treat mobile phones as if they were ordinary “objects 
capable of holding another object,”60 the Supreme Court is in a 
position and has a responsibility to outline the contours of this 
important aspect of Fourth Amendment law.61 But are the Justices of 
the Supreme Court equipped to handle this task or could there be a  
legislative answer?62
 55.  Id. at 824 (“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined 
by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by 
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it 
may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a 
garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe 
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless 
search of a suitcase.”). 
 56.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981). 
 57.  Id.
 58.  At least one court has rejected the notion that a mobile phone’s status as a 
container is dispositive of the issue. See Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d  448, 460 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2011) (“[W]hether or not a cell phone is properly characterized as a traditional 
‘container’ is irrelevant to whether or not it is searchable upon arrest.”). 
 59.  The Belton Court defined a container as “any object capable of holding another 
object.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4. In 1981, when Belton was decided, the first dictionary 
definition for the word “object” was “something that is put or may be regarded as put in the 
way of some of the senses: a discrete visible or tangible thing <saw an ~ in the distance>.” 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 1555 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981). 
 60.  See infra Part III.A. 
 61.  The Court has had the opportunity to address these issues in the following cases, 
for which it has denied certiorari: United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 94 (2011); State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071 (Conn. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S.Ct. 1474 (2011); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
 62. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (2004) 
(arguing legislatures are better equipped to adapt to changing technologies and advocating 
for judicial deference and acquiescence to legislatures until technologies “stabilize”); Daniel 
J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1535-36 (2010) 
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II. TECHNOLOGY MOVES TOO FAST FOR RIGID RULES
 “If I’m applying the First Amendment, I have to apply it to a world 
where there’s an Internet, and there’s Facebook, and there are movies 
like . . . ‘The Social Network,’ which I couldn’t even understand.”63
 It is not entirely clear that citizens of the United States can trust 
the United States Supreme Court to satisfactorily protect our digital 
privacy. The Court’s recent foray into applying constitutional 
principles to communications devices revealed a startling lack of 
comprehension regarding a technology that was arguably obsolete by 
the time the Court ruled.64 Although the Court’s general lack of 
technological savvy is troubling, more troubling is the Court’s 
apparent inability to appreciate the speed with which new 
technologies emerge and the potentially negative privacy 
implications of the Court’s holdings as these innovations become 
widely available to the public.65 In the earliest era of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the speed with which technologies 
became ubiquitous was quite slow,66 so the Court did not need to 
wrestle with rapidly changing technologies. For purposes of 
demonstrating the Court’s unsatisfactory attempts to apply historical 
principles to new innovations, I will examine two cases where the 
                                                                                                                  
(discussing a preference for allowing courts to handle regulation of government 
information-gathering via application and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 63.  Erik Schelzig, Supreme Court Justices Must Adapt to Facebook  
World, Says Breyer, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 16, 2010 8:14:28  
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40224302/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/ 
supreme-court-justices-must-adapt-facebook-world-says-breyer/#.TuOWY3r1tdh (quoting 
Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court).  
 64.  During oral arguments for City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), the 
Justices fumbled through a series of questions related to text messages sent via pager. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1332.pdf 
[hereinafter Quon Transcript]. During the questioning, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Scalia both appeared to be oblivious to the fact that communications sent via pager are 
transmitted through a third party and do not simply travel directly from one device to 
another, a consideration integral to understanding the third-party doctrine as it applies to 
private communications. See id. at 49-50. I do not address the third party doctrine in this 
Note. For two conflicting viewpoints regarding the doctrine, compare Orin S. Kerr, The 
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) with Erin Murphy, The 
Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009). Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy 
asked questions suggesting that they did not grasp that a pager is capable of receiving a 
message at the same time the user is composing a message. See Quon Transcript at 44. 
 65.  See infra Part II.B. 
 66.  See Nicholas Felton, Consumption Spreads Faster Today, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/02/10/opinion/10op.graphic.ready.html. 
See also Karl Hartig, Tuning In: Communications Technologies Historically Have Had 
Broad Appeal for Consumers, WALL ST. J. CLASSROOM EDITION (1998), available at
http://www.karlhartig.com/chart/techhouse.pdf. 
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Court has struggled to craft a rule based on fast-moving technology: 
Olmstead v. United States67 and Kyllo v. United States.68
A.   The Court’s Lack of Foresight in Olmstead
 The world’s first telephone was patented by Alexander Graham 
Bell in 1876.69 By 1910, seven million telephones were in use in the 
United States.70 In 1928, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a case that required the Justices to determine whether 
the Fourth Amendment provided any protection for private 
communications conducted via telephone.71 In 1928, at the time the 
Court ruled in Olmstead, approximately 40 percent of American 
households owned a telephone.72 In an opinion that perhaps many 
might find shocking today, the Court held that because telephone 
wires extend outside the physical exterior of a home, communications 
conducted on these lines do not enjoy the same Fourth Amendment 
protections as the inside of a home.73 The Court based its holding in 
Olmstead on the physical nature of the telephone wires and the fact 
that the communications intercepted were intended by the sender to 
extend out into the world for interception or listening in by anyone. 
The Court stated: 
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a 
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project  
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his 
house and messages while passing over them are not within  
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who 
intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either 
party to the conversation.74
Justice Brandeis wrote an elegant and prophetic dissent in which he 
questioned the effect the majority’s holding might have on private 
 67.  277 U.S. 438 (1928) (dealing with telephonic communications), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 68.  533 U.S. 27 (2001) (dealing with thermal imaging technology). 
 69.  See PBS, Technology Timeline: 1750-1990, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
amex/telephone/timeline/f_timeline.html (last visited July 1, 2012). By 1910, seven million 
telephones were in use in the United States. HERBERT NEWTON CASSON, THE HISTORY OF 
THE TELEPHONE at v (1911), available at http://books.google.com/ (search “the history of the 
telephone” and select the first link).  
 70.  CASSON, supra note 69. In this book, Casson states, “it is now an indispensible 
help to whoever would live the convenient life.” Id. This excited language regarding the 
ubiquity of the telephone may sound familiar to us today when we think about how 
dependent we are on the instant availability of e-mail, business documents, and other files 
on our mobile phones. 
 71.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 439. 
 72.  Gene Smiley, Economic History Services, The U.S. Economy in the 1920s, EH.NET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2010), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/smiley.1920s.final.  
 73.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (“The intervening wires are not part of his house or 
office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”). 
 74.  Id. at 466. 
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communications of American citizens, particularly in circumstances 
where scientific advancements provided government officials with 
new technological surveillance tools.75 Justice Brandeis, in his  
dissent, warned: 
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them 
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the  
most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic 
and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed 
beliefs, thoughts and emotions.76
 Notwithstanding Justice Brandeis’s pleas for the court to decide 
Olmstead in a manner that would provide for adaptation,77  the Court 
focused on an inside-the-home/outside-the-home dichotomy and held 
that the telephone wires in this case were necessarily unprotected, as 
they extended outside the defendant’s home and did not implicate 
any privacy concerns.78
 It took the United States Supreme Court over forty years to 
overturn the Olmstead decision. In 1967, the Court was faced with a 
similar eavesdropping case in Katz v. United States.79 The Justices 
took the opportunity to create what has remained the foundational 
analysis for searches conducted by agents of the government for more 
than forty years.80
 75.  Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Kerr, supra note 15, at 1023-24 
(discussing the “wrong turn” the Court made in Olmstead); Daniel J. Solove, Digital 
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086 
(2002) (noting that the Olmstead holding “symbolizes the Court’s lack of responsiveness to 
new technology, unwarranted formalism in its constitutional interpretation, and failure to 
see the larger purposes of the Fourth Amendment”).  
 76.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis was eerily 
correct regarding the possibility that our private papers might somehow be revealed 
without the government physically intruding, and the science-fiction enthusiast in me 
cannot help wondering if his speculation regarding “[a]dvances in the psychic and related 
sciences” may someday, too, come to fruition. Id.  
 77.  Id. at 472 (“Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific 
abuses of power, must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”). For 
discussion of how the Court has adapted and shifted its understanding of Fourth  
Amendment principles in the face of ever-advancing technologies, see Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1748222##.  
 78.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (majority opinion). 
 79.  389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 80.   Justice Harlan’s test, explained in his concurrence, has been used repeatedly by 
the United States Supreme Court in a variety of different search contexts. See, e.g., 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88-91 (1998) (applying test to defendants who were at an 
apartment for short period of time for purpose of bagging cocaine); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1988) (applying test to garbage placed at the roadside); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986) (applying test to law enforcement’s aerial 
surveillance of defendant’s fenced-in backyard); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-
81 (1984) (applying test to observation of marijuana plants by law enforcement officers who 
had trespassed on defendant’s property). 
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 Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence provides the foundation for 
analysis in his “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.81 According to 
this analysis, Fourth Amendment protection attaches where a person 
has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and that 
expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’ ”82 In Katz, the Court determined that an “electronic” 
intrusion may violate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.83 Forty years 
later, we must ask ourselves if the analysis announced in Katz and 
applied to physical phone lines could potentially be expanded to 
apply to digital information. Is it possible that in the last forty years 
we have seen another paradigm shift, in which citizens should be 
permitted to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of their mobile phones, much the same way Katz allowed  
the assertion of a privacy right in communications via physical  
phone line? 
B.   The Court’s Lack of Foresight in Kyllo
 In 2001, the Supreme Court made another attempt to apply the 
Fourth Amendment to a new technology when the Court decided 
Kyllo v. United States.84 A law enforcement officer suspected Danny 
Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his home.85 As part of their 
investigations, law enforcement officers used a device called the 
Agema Thermovision 21086 The end result of the Court’s decision in 
Kyllo is that the use of a thermal imaging device to learn that the 
defendant was growing marijuana inside his home was a search and 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it was an 
intrusion into the personal and private sphere of the home87:   
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by 
the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.88
 81.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 82.  Id. at 361. 
 83.  Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
 84.  533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
 85.  Id. at 29. 
 86.  Id.
 87.  Id. at 40. 
 88.  Id. at 34-35 (citation omitted). 
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 It is open to debate, however, whether this holding is a victory for 
privacy advocates or whether any positive value it may have is 
merely an illusion.89 First of all, it is not likely that courts would 
apply this same reasoning in cases outside the context of the home, 
given the home’s historically preferred status in Fourth Amendment 
law.90 Further, the Court hinged its holding on the fact that the 
device used by law enforcement was not in general public use.91
Presumably, if the device had been in general public use, the Court 
could have considered the heat differential coming off Kyllo’s house 
the type of information one knowingly exposes to the public and in 
which one has no reasonable expectation of privacy.92
 One need only imagine a relatively simple set of facts to see how 
Kyllo could be applied in a devastating manner to searches of mobile 
phones. Imagine you are riding in a car with a friend who, 
unbeknownst to you, is carrying a small amount of marijuana. Your 
friend’s vehicle is stopped for a minor traffic infraction, which 
eventually leads to both of you being arrested for misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance. Law enforcement officers seize 
your mobile phone and wish to look at its contents, based on their 
understanding that evidence of drug transactions is regularly 
communicated via mobile phone. Being a privacy-conscious person, 
you have password protected your phone, and despite officers’ efforts 
to obtain your password, you have remain tight-lipped. No worries. 
Given the wide availability to the general public of devices and 
processes used to either crack a password-protected phone93 or copy 
data from a password protected phone,94 the officer who uses one of 
 89.  See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological 
Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 11, 15-16 (Jeffrey 
Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011), available at http://books.google.com/ (search 
“Constitution 3.0”; then follow “Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Center” 
hyperlink) (noting that “Kyllo places few limitations on the use of technology to spy on the 
populace,” and calling the holding “little more than a pyrrhic victory for privacy advocates”). 
 90.  See LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 11. 
 91.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 92.  Under this analysis, the heat is akin to the trash left at the curbside in California 
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of her trash). 
 93.  See JONATHAN ZDZIARSKI, IPHONE FORENSICS: RECOVERING EVIDENCE, PERSONAL 
DATA & CORPORATE ASSETS (2008), available at http://books.google.com/ (search “iPhone 
Forensics”; then follow “IPhone Forensics: Recovering Evidence, Personal Data, and 
Corporate Assets” hyperlink). 
 94.  See Cellebrite Universal Forensics Extraction Device (UFED), CELLEBRITE,
http://www.cellebrite.com/forensic-products.html#UFED (last visited July 1, 2012). Absent 
any special hacking or cracking device, researchers have demonstrated that even 
computers or mobile phones protected by full disk encryption are vulnerable to breach and 
capable of having their data copied and inspected. See Eoghan Casey et al., The Growing 
Impact of Full Disk Encryption on Digital Forensics, 8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 129  
(2011); J. Alex Halderman et al., Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks  
on Encryption Keys, in PROC. 2008 USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 45, 56,
available at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec08/tech/full_papers/halderman/halderman.pdf
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these devices is conceivably not conducting a search, under Kyllo.
Where there is no search, there are no Fourth Amendment 
considerations. In this scenario, an officer can gain access to your 
private information simply because any member of the general public 
could do so. 
 There may not be a satisfactory resolution to these problems, 
however. Even if Justices truly understood these new technologies, 
the period of time it takes a case to reach the Supreme Court for 
review is likely to render rulings obsolete because such rulings would 
necessarily apply to obsolete technologies.95
III.   CAN COURTS CRAFT A SOLUTION?
A.   Conflicting Decisions Among State Courts and Courts of Appeals 
 The proliferation of mobile phones and the ever-increasing 
likelihood that a mobile phone will be discovered on an arrestee has 
caused struggle in state and lower federal courts due to the absence 
of a Supreme Court decision on the question.96 Courts considering the 
question have reached wildly divergent results based on similar 
facts.97 This is because courts have framed the issue in several 
different ways when announcing their decisions.98
                                                                                                                  
(documenting extraction of data from fully encrypted device and finding that “a moderately 
skilled attacker can circumvent many widely used disk encryption products if a laptop is 
stolen while it is powered on or suspended”). 
 95.  See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (discussing largely 
obsolete pager technology). 
 96.  See supra notes 3, 5, 8 and accompanying text; see, e.g., United States v. Deans, 
549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (supporting the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Finley that “if a cellphone is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data 
electronically stored in the device”); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 
1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (“[T]he automobile exception allows the search of 
the cell phone just as it allows a search of other closed containers found in vehicles.”); 
United States v. Lottie, No. 3:07cr51RM, 2008 WL 150046, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan.14, 2008) 
(finding a warrantless mobile phone search to be justified by exigent circumstances); 
United States v. Dennis, Criminal No. 07-008-DLB, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. 
Nov.13, 2007) (concluding that a search of a mobile phone incident to arrest no different 
from search of other evidence seized incident to arrest); United States v. Parada, 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 1291, 1303-04 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that where mobile phone seized incident to 
arrest, exigent circumstances justified accessing mobile phone’s record of calls because 
incoming calls might cause older calls to be overwritten). 
 97.  Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007), with United States 
v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 98.  See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 n.7 (focusing on the fact that the mobile phone 
was on the arrestee’s person, as opposed to simply within his immediate control); Hawkins 
v. State, 704 S.E. 2d 886, 891-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (acknowledging tremendous storage 
capacity of mobile phones and approving warrantless search where officer limited search to 
“a search for specific evidence of the crime for which Hawkins was arrested that the officer 
had good reason to believe was stored on the cell phone”). 
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 1.   Finley and Park: The Early Cases 
 In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
threw down the gauntlet when it held that an officer could lawfully 
search the digital contents of the arrestee’s mobile phone incident to 
his arrest.99 Finley marked the first time a federal court of appeals 
had expressly approved a law enforcement officer’s search of data 
stored on a mobile phone.100 The opinion in Finley gave a terse 
analysis of a search of the arrestee’s person incident to his arrest and 
flatly stated that the search was lawful under the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Robinson (defining the scope of the full search of a person 
to include containers) and Belton (defining container and approving 
the search of containers incident to arrest).101 There was very little 
discussion of the matter and virtually no discussion of possible  
privacy implications. 
 In a factually similar case decided within months of Finley, a 
California federal court expressly rejected the reasoning of Finley
and held that under Chadwick a search of a mobile phone that was in 
the arrestee’s possession should be analyzed as a “possession[] within 
an arrestee’s . . . control” and not as part of “the [arrestee’s] 
person.”102 Based on that classification, the Park court contended that 
Chadwick requires law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant for a 
search of a mobile phone seized incident to a lawful arrest.103 It 
appears that the Park court was trying to do the right thing, trying to 
find a way to protect citizens’ private information; however, the Park 
court’s attempt to protect citizens’ information came at the cost of 
questionable reasoning. In its explanation as to why mobile phones 
should be classified as possessions within the arrestee’s control 
rather than as part of a “full search of the person,”104 the Park court 
rested its analysis on the large amount of private information that 
can be stored on the phone.105 Accordingly, its holding is largely 
policy based; the court was concerned with the “far-ranging 
consequences” of allowing warrantless searches of mobile phones 
 99.  Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 n.7. After law enforcement officers conducted a controlled 
buy of methamphetamine involving the defendant, he was lawfully arrested. Id. at 253-54. 
A special agent who was an expert in narcotics trafficking, “searched through the phone’s 
call records and text messages.” Id. at 254.  
 100.  Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *7 (“[T]he Court is aware of only one circuit court case 
on the issue” of “whether officers may search the contents of a cellular phone as a search 
incident to arrest.”). 
 101.  Finley, 477 F.3d at 259-60. 
 102.  Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8.  
 103.  Id.
 104.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (noting that it is well settled 
that a full search of the person is both an exception to the warrant requirement and a 
reasonable search). 
 105.  Park, 2007 WL 1521573 at *8. 
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incident to arrest.106 Policy implications are important when 
considering the private data of United States citizens; however, 
where United States Supreme Court precedent requires a particular 
outcome, it seems disingenuous for a court to force the outcome of a 
case by simply relying on public policy.  
 Additionally, though the court in Park attempted to describe its 
decision as in accord with Supreme Court precedent, it did so 
unconvincingly. The mobile phones in question were “removed from” 
the defendants after they had been transported to booking.107 The 
Park court’s strained attempt to analogize these mobile phones to the 
locked container in Chadwick only undermines the court’s reasoning. 
A mobile phone discovered in the hand, in the pocket, or in another 
article of clothing that is actually on the defendant must necessarily 
be analyzed in the same manner as the pack of cigarettes in 
Robinson.108 It is unfortunate that Park was the first answer to 
Finley. Park’s analysis is confused and clumsy; it does not provide a 
satisfactory roadmap for how courts can adhere to constitutional 
principles as described by the Supreme Court and at the same time 
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. 
 2.   Courts Begin to Fall in Line Behind Finley
 After the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit finally spoke to the 
issue definitively in Finley, several state and federal courts fell in 
line.109 It is easy to understand why: Finley is simple. The analysis 
does not require courts to face the inevitable and difficult question of 
privacy associated with searches of mobile phones. If an item can fit 
easily within the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, 
why should lower courts belabor the issue and attempt to forge new 
legal ground? These courts are precedent-bound to apply the Court’s 
warrant exceptions faithfully, and most courts have followed Finley’s  
easy answer.  
 For example, in United States v. Wurie,110 officers lawfully 
arrested Brima Wurie for distributing cocaine.111 Officers observed 
that several calls on Wurie’s caller ID screen had come from “my 
house.”112 Fortuitously, Wurie’s mobile phone rang while it was in the 
 106.  Id.
 107.  Id. at *2. 
 108. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 (holding that officer was entitled to inspect crumpled 
pack of cigarettes discovered on the arrestee’s person incident to arrest). 
 109.  See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(“Decisions of district courts and Courts of Appeals (often analogizing cell phones to the 
earlier pager technology) trend heavily in favor of finding that the search incident to arrest 
or exigent circumstances exceptions apply to searches of the contents of cell phones.”).  
 110.  Id. at 104. 
 111.  Id. at 106.  
 112.  Id.
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possession of officers, and they flipped the phone open.113 When 
officers flipped the phone open, they saw that the call was coming 
from “my house” and saw a phone number.114 Officers then cross 
referenced the number and obtained the address associated with that 
number.115 The court held that “[t]he search of Wurie’s cell phone 
incident to his arrest was limited and reasonable. The officers, 
having seen the ‘my house’ notation on Wurie’s caller identification 
screen, reasonably believed that the stored phone number would lead 
them to the location of Wurie’s suspected drug stash.”116
 Courts that have followed Finley’s lead tend to focus on the 
distinction between a search of items on the arrestee’s person at the 
time of his arrest and those items merely in the arrestee’s immediate 
control.117 Those courts have also gone out of their way to mention 
that the quantity of information capable of storage on a mobile phone 
is not relevant to any consideration of whether a search of the 
phone’s data is permissible.118
 3.   Flipping the Script on Finley
 Is there any hope for privacy advocates after Finley? The courts 
that have questioned the search in Finley so far have come at it from 
a few different directions. Some courts have reasoned that a mobile 
phone does not fit Belton’s definition of a container.119 Other courts 
have, in the context of an inventory search, held that a search of the 
contents of a mobile phone cannot be justified under the rationales 
advanced for the warrantless inventory search.120 Additionally, a few 
courts have rejected the search of data on a mobile phone incident to 
arrest because it does not comport with the Supreme Court’s original 
justifications for allowing a search of the arrestee contemporaneous 
to a lawful arrest.121 Further, some courts have rejected the notion 
that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless search of a  
mobile phone.122
 113.  Id.
 114.  See id.
 115.  Id. at 106-07. 
 116.  Id. at 110. 
 117.  See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (Cal. 2011) (describing the 
distinction as “the key question” in the case). 
 118.  See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009); Diaz, 244 
P.3d at 508. But see Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (discussing 
why the amount of information on the phone doesn’t matter under Supreme Court 
precedent but suggesting that perhaps this is a legitimate concern).  
 119.  See infra Part III.A.3(i). 
 120.  See infra Part III.A.3(ii). 
 121.  See infra Part III.A.3(iii). 
 122.  See infra Part III.A.3(iv).  
1096 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1077
 (i)   A Mobile Phone is Not a Container 
 Although the analysis in Finley is tempting in its simplicity of 
application, several courts have recently acknowledged its 
shortcomings and have focused their analysis on the nature of a 
mobile phone. These courts have rejected the notion that a mobile 
phone is a “container.”123 The leading case in this respect is State v. 
Smith,124 in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a mobile 
phone is not a closed container under the United State’s Supreme 
Court’s holding in Belton.125 The Finley court did not expressly refer 
to a mobile phone as a container, but implied it through its reference 
to searches of containers under Belton.126 A close examination of the 
language in Belton suggests that its analysis should only extend to 
containers that can contain physical objects.127 Although a mobile 
phone is itself a physical object, the data stored on or in the phone is 
not contained in the manner contemplated by the Supreme Court in 
Belton. If one were to truly apply Belton’s “container” definition to a 
mobile phone, Belton would permit an officer to open the battery door 
on the phone and remove the battery. Belton contemplates a physical 
opening of a closed container. Of course, Belton was decided in 1981, 
long before mobile phones were generally available to the public.128   
 (ii)   An Inventory Search is Not an Investigation 
 One court facing the mobile-phone-search evaluated the search 
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the inventory 
exception, and the exigent circumstances exception.129 The Wall court 
rejected all three rationales, but its discussion of the inventory 
justification offers some good advice for how attempted inventory 
searches of mobile phone data should be handled.130 The court found 
that searching text messages was not a proper inventory search 
because it did not serve the rationales for the creation of the 
 123.  See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text for the Belton Court’s definition  
of “container.” 
 124. 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).  
 125. Id. at 954. 
 126. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 127.  The Belton Court’s holding that officers may examine objects inside a container 
necessarily requires that the container be capable of holding “objects.” New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981). See also Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth 
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 57 (2008) (“[T]he search incident to arrest doctrine . . . 
has been framed with tangible physical evidence in mind.”). 
 128.  The first mobile phone call was placed by a Motorola Executive in 1973. GERARD
GOGGIN, CELL PHONE CULTURE: MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 29-30 (2006). 
Generally, wide availability of mobile phones to the public did not occur until the 1990s. 
See H. Lacohée, N. Wakeford & I. Pearson, A Social History of the Mobile Telephone with a 
View of its Future, BT TECH. J., July 2003 at 203, 205.  
 129.  United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412 (S.D. Fla. Dec.  
22, 2008). 
 130. Id. at *3-4.  
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inventory search exception to the warrant requirement: “to protect 
property from theft and the police from lawsuits based on lost or 
stolen property.”131 The court acknowledged that mobile phones 
could, of course, be inventoried, but noted that “there is no need to 
document the phone numbers, photos, text messages, or other data 
stored in the memory of a cell phone to properly inventory the 
person’s possessions because the threat of theft concerns the cell 
phone itself, not the electronic information stored on it.”132 Although 
there is not presently any indication that law enforcement officers 
intend to justify mobile phone searches under the inventory warrant 
exception, the language and reasoning in Wall should serve as a 
guide for further analysis of these issues when they arise. 
 (iii)   Searching Data on a Mobile Phone Incident to Arrest Does 
Not Further the Supreme Court’s Justifications for the Search 
Incident to Arrest Doctrine 
 An additional tool courts may have in asserting that mobile phone 
searches incident to arrest should not be conducted absent a warrant 
is that such searches do not further the traditional goals of the 
search incident to arrest doctrine: officer safety and the preservation 
of evidence. In an opinion drafted prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gant, the Middle District of Florida held that where Ariel 
Quintana was arrested for driving with a suspended license, an 
officer’s search of his mobile phone was not a valid search incident to 
arrest.133 After the officer placed Quintana under arrest, the officer 
noticed the smell of raw marijuana, but no marijuana was discovered 
inside the vehicle or on Quintana’s person.134 In an effort to further 
investigate the smell, the officer looked through photographs on 
Quintana’s mobile phone, including a photograph “of an intimate 
nature involving a woman as well as a photo of marijuana plants in  
what he characterized as a marijuana ‘grow house.’ ”135 The court 
held that such a search “had nothing to do with officer safety or the 
preservation of evidence related to the crime of arrest,” and  
“pushe[d] the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine beyond its limits.”136
 This wisdom became the law of the land when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant.137 In State v. Smith, decided 
after Gant, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “the justifications 
behind allowing a search incident to arrest are officer safety and the 
 131.  Id. at *4. 
 132.  Id.
 133.  United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 134.  Id. at 1295. 
 135.  Id. at 1296. 
 136.  Id. at 1300. 
 137.  556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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preservation of evidence. There is no evidence that either 
justification was present in this case.”138 Notably, Smith was a drug-
related case.139 Generally, courts have held that drug-related cases 
present a high likelihood that evidence of the crime of arrest will be 
discovered on the arrestee’s mobile phone and have largely permitted 
such searches.140 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that an 
individual’s privacy interest in the contents of his mobile phone 
required law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant prior to 
intruding into the mobile phone’s contents even though the state’s 
interest in collecting and preserving evidence justified its  
warrantless seizure.141
 (iv)   The Exigent Circumstances Rationale for Warrantless  
Pager-searches Incident to Arrest Should Not Extend to  
Mobile Phones 
 Before mobile phones were in the pockets of millions of Americans, 
there was the pager. Much of the case law that has emerged 
regarding searches of mobile phones is based on precedent that was 
based on searches of pagers. The United States Supreme Court has 
not directly ruled on a warrantless search of a pager incident to 
arrest,142 but several Circuit Courts of Appeals have validated 
warrantless searches of pagers, citing exigent circumstances and the 
need to preserve evidence.143 Some courts have distinguished pagers 
from mobile phones and have held that the line of cases dealing with 
 138.  State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009). 
 139. Id. at 950. 
 140.  See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011). 
 141.  Smith, 920 N.E. 2d at 955 (“Once the cell phone is in police custody, the state has 
satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence and can take 
preventive steps to ensure that the data found on the phone are neither lost nor erased. 
But because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone's contents, police 
must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s contents.”). 
 142. Mark Mayakis, Comment, Cell Phone – A “Weapon” of Mass Discretion, 33 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 151, 156 (2010).  
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, No. 96-4259, 1998 WL 887289, at *3 (4th Cir. 
Oct. 29, 1998) (upholding warrantless search of pager incident to arrest based on the 
possibility that evidence might be destroyed if no search occurred); United States v. Ortiz, 
84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the information on a pager can be destroyed 
by turning off the device or touching a button and stating that “it is imperative that law 
enforcement officers have the authority to immediately ‘search’ or retrieve, incident to a 
valid arrest, information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as evidence.”); 
United States v. Stroud, No. 93-30445, 1994 WL 711908, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) 
(“[T]he pager was seized incident to a lawful arrest and searched to obtain evidence that 
might otherwise have been destroyed. This exigent circumstance combined with the lawful 
seizure destroyed [defendant’s] reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his 
pager. In light of these facts, we find that the district court did not err by denying 
[defendant’s] motion to suppress the pager evidence.”).  
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pager searches is inapplicable in mobile phone search cases and 
therefore has no precedential value.144
 But is there a possibility that mobile phone data could be 
destroyed in other ways, such as remote wiping?145 Perhaps. But even 
if remote wiping were a widespread obstacle preventing officers from 
doing good and honest police work, Justice Werdegar, of the 
California Supreme Court, dispenses with this potential argument in 
her Diaz dissent when she points out that even where remote data 
wiping is possible, law enforcement can easily thwart such action 
simply by removing the phone’s battery.146
 4.  Bound by Precedent? 
 For the privacy advocate, there are some signs that courts may be 
beginning to listen regarding our desire to protect the private 
information we store on our mobile devices. In a case currently before 
the Florida Supreme Court,147 the First District Court of Appeal 
issued an opinion upholding a warrantless mobile phone search 
under the United States Supreme Court’s precedents, but seriously 
questioning the soundness and wisdom of allowing such searches 
where there is no reasonable belief the phone contains evidence of 
the crime of arrest.148 In Smallwood, the crime of arrest was armed 
robbery.149 The court held that it was bound to determine this case 
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson
and stated that “containers found upon a person incident to arrest 
may be searched without ‘additional justification.’ ”150 The Florida 
district court of appeal noted that Gant was not applicable as its 
holding only applied to searches incident to arrest in an automobile 
context.151 The court found Gant “informative,” however,152 stating  
as follows: 
Were we free to do so, we would find, given the advancement of 
technology with regards to cell phones and other similar portable 
electronic devices, officers may only search cell phones incident to 
 144.  See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. May 23, 2007) (discussing overwriting of data on pager and exigent circumstances 
justifying warrantless search of pager that do not exist for mobile phones). 
 145.  See, e.g., Melanie Barton Zoltán, How to Wipe Your Phone Remotely,
PCWORLD (Nov. 3, 2010 1:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/209605/ 
how_to_wipe_your_phone_remotely.html.  
 146.  Diaz, 244 P.3d at 515 n.24 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 147.  See Florida Supreme Court Docket, Case Number: SC11-1130, FLORIDA SUPREME 
COURT, http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/docket/ds_docket?p_caseyear=2011&p_casenumber=1130 
(last visited July 1, 2012).  
 148. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 459-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).  
 149.  Id. at 448. 
 150.  Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
 151.  Id. at 462.  
 152.  Id.
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arrest if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found on the phone. Here, there was no evidence 
the officer had such a reasonable belief.153
It appears that courts are beginning to recognize that we have a 
problem here that cannot be simply resolved under existing Supreme 
Court precedent. My hope is that more judges begin to step  
up, as Judge Wolf did in the Smallwood opinion, and ask for  
some clarification.
B.   Some Proposed Solutions 
American courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent,154 but 
American law professors are not. Scholars have dedicated hundreds 
of pages of analysis to this problem in recent years.155 Through these 
proposals, scholars attempt to craft a workable rule that affirms the 
privacy expectations citizens have for their personal information. But 
given the rapid advancement of mobile phone technology, it is clear 
that this exercise is fraught with difficulties. 
Take, for example, a proposal discussed by Adam Gershowitz only 
four years ago.156 Gershowitz noted that the mobile phone cases that 
had been decided at that point in time did not deal with searches that 
went very deep into the data on a phone.157 Gershowitz explored a 
possible bright-line rule that might be a workable solution to the 
mobile phone search problem. He proposed that “courts could set a 
bright-line rule that police can take five steps, but no more, when 
rummaging through an iPhone’s contents.”158 Gershowitz admits that 
this number is arbitrary but notes that its value would be in its 
ability to act as a clear rule law enforcement officers could follow 
with ease.159 Under this proposal, an officer would be constitutionally 
permitted to take only five steps “into” the phone without obtaining  
a warrant.  
The appeal of this approach is that it would solve some of the 
problems presented by a mobile phone’s almost infinite capacity to 
“contain” data; the problem with this approach is that, unfortunately, 
it is already nearly obsolete only four years after it was proposed. 
Most mobile phones provide the user instant access to e-mail, social 
 153.  Id.
 154. State courts are free, of course, to provide in their state constitutional analogs 
more protection than the floor provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Cooper v. 
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (noting states have power to impose higher standards 
than those required by the federal Constitution). 
 155.  See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 127; Kerr, supra note 62; Solove, supra note 62. 
 156.  Gershowitz, supra note 127. Professor Gershowitz notes that this proposal is likely 
to cause more problems than it solves, however. Id. at 54.  
 157.  Id. at 41. 
 158.  Id. at 54. 
 159.  Id. at 55. 
2012]  THE WHOLE WORLD CONTAINED 1101
networking sites, and even in some instances bank information.160
Applying this proposal to a mobile phone search in the age of 
smartphones would provide little protection of private information.  
Professor Gershowitz has also explored the possibility that 
citizens might be able to protect their private information by locking 
their mobile phones with a password.161 However, Gershowitz all but 
decimates this possibility by noting the wide availability of password-
cracking techniques and devices law enforcement officers and 
members of the general public now have access to.162 Gershowitz also 
explores the possibility that one might be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment in the event she is coerced into providing a password or 
otherwise provides the password involuntarily.163 As he points out, 
the most notable thing about this inquiry is that in such a  
situation, Fifth Amendment protection would likely only  
attach where a criminal charge ensues.164 This means that there may 
be no protection for the innocent person who is browbeaten into 
providing her mobile phone password to an overzealous law  
enforcement officer.165
Another notable privacy scholar, Daniel J. Solove, has suggested 
that the Supreme Court abandon the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test altogether.166 Although this may seem quite extreme to 
some, it may be the only way to truly protect intimate information 
citizens clearly want protected. As Justice Scalia famously wrote, 
“[i]n my view, the only thing the past three decades have established 
about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable 
expectations of privacy] . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those 
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”167
 160.  Many banks now offer online banking specifically designed for mobile phone access. 
See, e.g., Mobile Banking FAQs, REGIONS, http://www.regions.com/faq/mobile_banking.rf  
(last visited July 1, 2012); Mobile Banking FAQs, USBANK,
http://www.usbank.com/mobile/mobilefaqs.html (last visited July 1, 2012); Mobile Banking,
WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/mobile/ (last visited July 1, 2012).  
 161.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell 
Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1147-65 (2011). 
 162. Id. at 1164-65. 
 163.  Id. at 1168. 
 164. Id. at 1173. 
 165.  Id. (“In the event that police find no incriminating information on an arrestee’s 
phone and do not bring criminal charges as a result of an arrestee turning over his 
password, there is a strong argument that truly innocent individuals have no civil-rights 
remedy because, under the Court’s decision in Chavez v. Martinez, Fifth Amendment 
claims are limited to ‘criminal cases.’ ”) (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764-65 
(2003) (plurality opinion)). 
 166.  Solove, supra note 62, at 1524 (“Looking at expectations is the wrong inquiry. The 
law should protect certain information regardless of whether people expect it to be private  
or not.”). 
 167.  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Finally, Orin S. Kerr advocates for legislative intervention rather 
than judicial determination of issues on the cutting edge of 
technology.168 However, it is not yet clear that legislatures have the 
will to write mobile phone protections into law. In 2011, the 
California State Legislature became the first state legislature to 
address the issue when the California State Assembly and the 
California State Senate sent SB 914169 to California’s Governor for 
his signature. This bill provided that “[t]he information contained in 
a portable electronic device shall not be subject to search by a law 
enforcement officer incident to a lawful custodial arrest except 
pursuant to a warrant issued by a duly authorized magistrate . . . .”170
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, stating that the courts were 
better equipped to deal with search and seizure issues.171 Orin Kerr 
noted that the Governor had it “exactly backwards.”172
IV. MOBILE PHONE: MORE THAN A LAPTOP
Today’s mobile phones are capable of doing the same things 
laptop and desktop computers are capable of. Arguably, mobile 
phones have the potential to reveal even more of an individual’s 
private information, since the mobile phone is often carried 
everywhere, at all times. Furthermore, the mobile phone’s ability to 
track and locate individuals raises serious concerns regarding 
potential government use or abuse. Given the vast amount of data 
accessible from a mobile phone, at the very least, courts should 
evaluate a mobile phone exactly the same way they would evaluate a 
laptop computer. A search for case law regarding warrantless 
searches of laptop computers incident to arrest did not return any 
results, possibly because law enforcement officers regularly seek and 
obtain warrants prior to conducting these searches. One Department 
of Justice manual explores the issue, suggests that the law is not 
settled, and instructs that in some instances the best practice may be 
to seize the computer and then obtain a warrant.173
It is clear to me that any analogy likening a mobile phone to an 
address book, a pager, or a physical container is superficial and 
detrimental. Mobile phones are more than this; they are repositories 
 168.  Kerr, supra note 62, at 888. 
 169.  S. 914, 2011 Leg., 2010-11 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.html. 
 170.  Id.
 171.  David Kravets, Calif. Governor Veto Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches,
WIRED (Oct. 10, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/ 
warrantless-phone-searches/. 
 172.  Id.
 173.  H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING 
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 33-34 
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
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for our private thoughts, much like locked diaries. In the spirit of  
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of papers and effects,  
law enforcement officers should respect the privacy of United  
States citizens and defer to a neutral and detached magistrate  
empowered to issue warrants to make the choice regarding whether 
or not to search.  
Courts seem confused,174 but users do not. Users of mobile phones 
fiercely advocate for privacy and security in the personal information 
accessible via their mobile phones.175 This is evidence that mobile 
phone users have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
contents of their mobile phones. It is almost a laughable notion that 
this expectation is one that society is not prepared to recognize  
as reasonable (to speak in the language of Katz176). It is time the 
courts recognized and respected mobile phone users’ privacy  
by requiring law enforcement officers seek and obtain a warrant 
prior to rummaging around in the private world contained on our  
mobile phones.  
 174.  See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (“[T]he line between cell phones and personal computers has grown increasingly 
blurry . . . .”); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (refusing to classify mobile 
phones as either address books or computers). 
 175.  For evidence of this, simply look to the recent scandals surrounding Carrier  
IQ and the News of the World phone hacking scandal. See Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, 
Carrier IQ ‘May Have’ Collected Text Messages, ZDNET (Dec. 14, 2011, 3:58  
AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/hardware/carrier-iq-may-have-collected-text-messages/17122; 
Indu Chandrasekhar et al., Phone Hacking: Timeline of the Scandal,
TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/phone-hacking/8634176/ 
Phone-hacking-timeline-of-a-scandal.html (last visited July 1, 2012 ). 
 176.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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